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Introduction
As psychologists we are
trained to be sensitive
to cultural differences.
Worldviews and culture
are interdependent.
They shape our views
of everything, including
what exists, how we
know, how things work,
the nature of persons,
right and wrong, and the
ways we conceptualize
human problems,
interventions, and
treatment goals. Truer
or more accurate
worldviews can thus
benefit clients, while
less accurate
worldviews may impair
treatment or even cause
harm. CONTACT
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ABSTRACT
Clinicians generally seek to do the right thing in their work. In this
process, they are inevitably guided daily by their worldviews, which are
intertwined with their cultures. Worldviews include beliefs about knowledge
claims, the nature of human persons, ethical and moral perspectives, what is
healthy and dysfunctional, what makes for optimal human functioning, and
specific notions about good and evil (Bufford, 2012). Such belief sets are
often referred to as core schemas or cognitive structures.
In America today, three widespread schemas are:
1) Strict empiricism - or science as the preferred way of knowing
2) Materialist reductionism (physicalism) as a view of all that exists
3) Relativism in ethics
Though these are theoretical concepts, they have profound
implications and consequences, conscious and unconscious, for clinical work.
Each of these views implicitly rejects holistic and purposeful
conceptions of human life. Empiricism, physicalism, and relativism contribute
to a partisan, piecemeal, fragmented, disintegrated, and abridged view of the
nature of the universe, the course of history, and of human persons.
A more realistic, critically based, evidentially sound view of the nature
of reality can make psychotherapy more effective. Holding alternative
worldviews could make psychotherapy less effective, useless, or even
harmful. We will use clinical examples to illustrate the implications of these
notions, and present some ways to sensitively and ethically address them.

GAINING KNOWLEDGE THROUGH BOTH
PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE
Many personal beliefs and values with important clinical implications
naturally follow from the acceptance or rejection of particular views. These
include views on whether human beings can know and act upon knowledge
apart from science, whether we have merely instrumental or deeply intrinsic
value, whether we have libertarian free will or are wholly determined by the
laws of physics and chemistry, and whether personal improvement (both
moral and non-moral) is possible or rendered incoherent by relativism.
Here we propose first, that knowledge is available in many ways apart
from narrow empiricism. Second, we live in a world of immaterial essences
joined to physical bodies, not merely material bodies. Third, important core
elements of morality and ethics are indeed true for everyone, not merely
subject to arbitrary, constructivist, social or individual hermeneutic whims.
There is good evidence for these notions and therefore good reason to
believe them.

Scientific studies can tell us what is statistically normative, but they cannot tell us
what is truly normal—or perhaps more aptly what is right and good. Indeed, the very task of
defining science (arriving at the answer to the question what is science?) is unscientific, for it
is an unavoidably philosophical set of questions.
Indeed, to see the absurdity of the converse, try to imagine what it would look like to
try to answer the question what is science by doing exclusively experimental or empirical
activities. Defining science is not an empirical process, but is in the domain of philosophy of
science. This brings us to the primacy of philosophy as a second-order discipline, which
inevitably manifests judgments prior to all enquiries in other, first-order disciplines, such as
the science of psychology.
This is as true in science as in other theoretical enterprises. Before exploration can
begin, philosophical questions are either explicitly or implicitly answered, and taken to be the
basis upon which all research is conducted. Ethical issues, presuppositions, methodological
preferences, and teleology (why is this pursuit being engaged in?) all function as pre-inquiry
preliminaries, always and without exception, and we take ourselves to “have knowledge”
regarding these things before we test for the null hypothesis.
It has become astonishing in clinical psychology, as in many other disciplines, how
the question “what is ultimate?” has been reduced to the pragmatic question, “what works?”
It is also disconcerting that many believe the second question can be adequately answered
while ignoring the first.
As a practical application, consider how a counselor might respond to a client who
claims that part of her problem is “the demons.” For a counselor who does not think demons
are real, a possible response may be to seek to discredit her belief in demons or to address
her delusions. A counselor who considers demons real, however, may want to take or more
explorative approach that examines the client’s beliefs about demons and her explanation of
how they may be a problem . A somewhat different way of approaching this question might be
to ask the client: “How do you know that your problem is the demons?” This approach at
least allows that the client may know something that the counselor does not know—or at least
may not yet know. Even those who believe in the existence of demons may doubt demons
account for the client’s problems. Similar problems arise when we need to evaluate a claim
that “God told me to . . .” Think about the story of the prophet Ezekiel, told to lie on his left
side for 390 days (Ez 4).
Similarly, agency matters. The whole counseling process is based on the assumption
that what we do as counselors and clients can make a difference. Yet for many, science is
undergirded with the implicit belief that material causation is the only form of causation. Under
that assumption there is nothing the client can do about his problem—and nothing the
counselor can do as well, since the actions of both are determined by their antecedent natural
causes. Thus a logical corollary of material causation alone is fatalism and hopelessness.
Though not in a moral sense in most cases, still, our view that some human condition
needs to be changed implies a value judgment, a belief about good and evil. A recent client
reported that she came to see me because she was angry, sad and tearful, had lost her
appetite, and was having difficulty sleeping. Essentially, she implied that this was a bad way
for her to be. I agreed. But imagine for a minute that I had not, and said to her, “So how is
that a problem?”
Recently another client proposed that her health was failing and her future was likely
to become increasingly pain-filled. She indicated that she was considering physician-assisted
suicide, legally permissible in Oregon. The unspoken underlying premise for her was that she
would be better off dead. However, if Christian views of death are true, she is profoundly
wrong. As her therapist, how should I then proceed? The answer hinges on worldview
considerations regarding:
• What exists and how we can know it.
• How reality works.
• Good and evil.

Consider the following dialogue:

A CLINICAL DIALOGUE
• Therapist: “Why don’t you try the strategies we discussed this next week
and see how it goes?”
• Client: “I am a skeptic, doc. I do not like to act unless I know that I know all
the relevant data. I don’t trust anyone or anything unless they can prove it
to me.”
• Therapist: “So you like evidence for your facts, or you won’t proceed?”
• Client: “Yes. And I don’t think you have shown me that this will work.”
• Therapist: “Can you think of anything that you know, or of any decision you
have ever made about which you actually had every conceivable, relevant,
or available bit of information, before you proceeded?”
• Client: “Let me see… I guess not, there are a lot of unknowns…”
• Therapist: “So it seems like we can live, think, know, and act in the world
without total or 100% proof that it is the best course every time?”
• Client: “I guess that’s how I live and make decisions anyway; not based on
perfect proof, but on probabilities. I never really thought of it like that.”
• Therapist: “And does it seem to you that there is enough evidence, or
reason to believe this might work for you?”
• Client: “I guess so.”
• Therapist: “Sounds good.”

CONCLUSIONS
Worldviews matter. They shape the way we understand ourselves,
each other, and the world around us. Counseling or psychotherapy is a
thoroughly worldview-embedded enterprise. Our worldviews shape the ways
we conceptualize problems, the interventions that we embrace and to which
we object, and the goals we desire. For counseling to progress there must be
a good enough match between the worldviews of counselor and client so that
they can form a relationship or working alliance that share views of the
problem interventions, and goals. There must also be an embrace of the
notions that such an enterprise is possible, worthwhile, and effective.
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